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The Implementation of Inter-American Norms on
Freedom of Religion in the National Legislation of
OAS Member States
Evaldo Xavier Gomes
INTRODUCTION
On November 22, 1969, members of the Organization of
American States (“OAS”) met in San José, Costa Rica, to adopt the
American Convention on Human Rights (“Convention”).1 After its
eleventh ratification, deposited by Grenada on July 18, 1978, the
treaty went into force.2 Through this Pact of San José, the OAS
established two organs “to supervise the implementation and
enforcement of the rights contained therein.”3 These organs, namely,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”)
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“Court”), have
protected the right to exercise religious freedom in the American
hemisphere by vigorously promoting the defense of all human rights.
While the Commission existed prior to adoption of the Convention,
the Convention redefined its functions4 and created the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.5 It also outlined specific human
rights and norms, including rights to religious freedom.6

 PhD in Utroque Iure (Canon and Civil Law). The author would like to thank Rex P.
Nielson for his help in translation and the staff of the BYU Law Review for their editorial
assistance.
1. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter Convention].
2. See id. at art. 74(2). The table of signatory states and dates of ratification is included
at 1144 U.N.T.S., at 144 n. 1. Id.
3. SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (1992).
4. See Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 34–51.
5. See id. at arts. 52–73; see also Victor Rodriguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The
Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and a
Modern-Day Critique, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593, 600, 610 (2000).
6. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 12(1)–(4) (“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of conscience and of religion. This right includes freedom to maintain or to change one’s
religion or beliefs, and freedom to profess or disseminate one’s religion or beliefs, either
individually or together with others, in public or in private. 2. No one shall be subject to
restrictions that might impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion or beliefs. 3.
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On various occasions, the Court and the Commission have
intervened to revise domestic legislation of OAS member states to
guarantee religious freedom. These interventions are particularly
significant because of the relationship between Inter-American
regional norms and the internal legal ordinances of states parties to
the Convention. Article 2 of the Convention obligates the states
parties to ensure the rights and freedoms guaranteed therein,7 and
therefore the regional norms espoused by the Convention prevail
over conflicting national laws.8 Practical examples of both the
regional organs protecting human rights and the pronouncements of
the General Assembly of the OAS corroborate the efficacy of the
system in protecting religious freedom for each individual.
In this Article, I discuss the legal instruments enacted to expand
and enforce human rights among the member states of the OAS. I
also summarize examples of specific cases brought before the
Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. While
both organs are valuable institutions for the development of human
rights law in the Inter-American system, they cannot replace
protection of religious freedom at the national level. The InterAmerican system’s organs of human rights protection serve the
important purpose of voicing regional condemnation of human
rights violations and of enforcing the commitment of each state to
protect its citizens’ rights and freedoms. In Part II, I outline the
method used by the Commission and the Court to effectuate the
rights protected by the instruments of human rights protection in
the Inter-American system. In Part III, I discuss cases that have
come before the Commission and the Court dealing specifically with
the protection of religious freedom.

Freedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs may be subject only to the limitations
prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the
rights or freedoms of others. 4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to
provide for the religious and moral education of their children or wards that is in accord with
their own convictions.”).
7. Id. at art. 2.
8. Indeed, the Preamble to the Convention affirms that the parties recognize:
[T]hat the essential rights of man are not derived from one’s being a national of a
certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human personality, and that they
therefore justify international protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or
complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the American States.
Id. at Pmbl.
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II. THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION AND INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
A. States’ Duties to Guarantee Rights
In the first article of the American Convention on Human
Rights, the states parties to the Convention agree to undertake to
respect, guarantee, and permit the exercise of the rights and
freedoms recognized in the Convention.9 Among the rights specified
in the Convention is the right of each individual person10 who is
subject to the jurisdiction of a member state to exercise his rights
and freedoms without any discrimination of a religious nature.11
Thus, the Convention incorporates into its first article the principle
of nondiscrimination.
According to the norms of Article 2 of the Convention, states
parties have the duty to guarantee the right to exercise freedoms
protected by the Convention.12 To accomplish this, they must, in
accordance with their own constitutional processes, adopt legislative
or other measures necessary to implement these rights and
freedoms.13 While such measures are to be adopted in accordance
with the respective constitutional norms of the member state, the
obligation to comply with the terms of the Convention are
unqualified. The most obvious method for member states to give
effect to the norms of the Convention is by including these norms in
their national legislation, but the Convention does not forbid doing
so through measures of another nature. The intent of Article 2 is
thus to guarantee the efficacy of the norms of the Convention by
imposing a positive duty on the states parties to change any
noncompliant laws. Otherwise, the Convention would run the risk of
becoming a dead letter, having no application in the lives of the
individuals within the jurisdiction of its member states.
The Commission plays an important role in monitoring the
states’ observance of Article 2 of the Convention. To this end, the

9. Id. at art. 1.
10. The Convention clarifies the definition of “person” as meaning “every human
being.” Id. at art. 1(2).
11. Id. at art. 1(1).
12. Id. at art. 2.
13. Id.
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Commission releases an annual report identifying human rights
problems within states parties to the Convention. This system of
monitoring encourages countries found to have human rights
problems to voluntarily remedy violations through changes in their
domestic laws before being brought before the Commission or the
Court. A concrete example of a change in law that resulted from the
influence of the Commission on an OAS member state is Colombian
law No. 288/96, passed by the Congress of Colombia on July 5,
1996.14 This law regulates the procedure to comply with the
decisions of international organs to protect human rights, such as the
Commission,15 which had condemned Colombia for violating human
rights.16 The Colombian law created a competent Committee of
Ministers to consider the decisions of the international organization,
and in cases where the Committee agrees with the international
body’s decision, the law requires the government to pay
compensation to human rights victims.17 The adoption of law No.
288 by Columbia was subsequently recognized by the InterAmerican Commission as a “very important measure taken to protect
human rights in Columbia.”18 However, the Commission noted that
Colombia needed to take further steps to effectively ensure
compliance with all of the Commission’s recommendations,
including the recommendations that states investigate and sanction
those who violate human rights.19

14. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev., Ch. V, ¶ 7 (1996), available at http://www.cidh.
oas.org/annualrep/96eng/chap.5.htm#COLOMBIA [hereinafter 1996 Annual Report]. The
report was approved by the Commission in its 95th Ordinary Period of Sessions, held between
February 24, 1997, and March 14, 1997.
15. Id. at Ch. V, ¶¶ 7–8.
16. In its 1995 report, the Commission condemned Colombia for failure to comply
with Article 2 of the Convention when the Colombian army executed a Swiss missionary.
Hildegard María Feldman v. Colombia, Case 11.010, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 15/95,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.91, doc. 7 rev. (1995), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/
95eng/Colombia11010.htm.
17. See 1996 Annual Report, supra note 14, at Ch. V, ¶ 8.
18. Id. at Ch. V, ¶ 10.
19. Id.
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B. Meaning and Reach of Commission Recommendations According to
the Interpretation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
As part of its responsibilities, the Commission makes
recommendations to member nations. In order to fully understand
the meaning of the term “recommendations” as it is used by the
Commission, it is helpful to look to the judgments of the InterAmerican Court. According to the judgment of the Court in the case
of Caballero-Delgado & Santana, the term should be interpreted
according to the regulations of Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.20 In the understanding of the
Court, this means that “a recommendation does not have the
character of an obligatory judicial decision for which the failure to
comply would generate State responsibility.”21 Thus, states cannot be
held responsible for refusing to follow a Commission
recommendation—the recommendation is not obligatory. Apart
from suffering the potential embarrassment or reciprocity that may
attend flouting the decisions of an international organization, states
are free to ignore Commission recommendations without fear of
reprisal.
Nearly two years later in the case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru,22 the
Inter-American Court reaffirmed this same understanding, but in a
more nuanced way. From a wider perspective which takes into
account the principle of good faith “embodied in . . . Article 31(1)
of the Vienna Convention,” the Court judged that a member state
participating in a treaty on human rights “has the obligation to make
every effort to apply [sic] with the recommendations of a protection
organ such as the Inter-American Commission.”23 Specifically
regarding a state’s responsibility to comply or not with the
recommendations, the Court asserted that, by ratifying the
Convention, states parties “engage themselves to apply the

20. Caballero-Delgado & Santana v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 22, ¶
67 (Dec. 8, 1995), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec_22_ing.pdf. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention states, “A treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
21. Caballero-Delgado & Santana, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 22, ¶ 67.
22. Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33 (Sept. 17, 1997),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ seriec_33_ing.pdf.
23. Id. ¶ 80.
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recommendations made by the Commission in its reports.”24 The
Court does not use the term obligation, but rather affirms the duty
of the states parties to follow the recommendations of the
Commission as part of the commitment assumed as members of the
Inter-American system and as part of their adherence to the
Commission’s legal instruments.
C. State Implementation of Inter-American Norms Protecting
Religious Freedom
When a country violates a right guaranteed by the Convention, a
person or group of persons, or any legally recognized nongovernmental entity may petition the Commission to review the
state’s conduct.25 Upon acceptance of a petition the Commission
collects the facts, seeks to assist the parties in reaching a friendly
settlement, and may issue recommendations to the involved parties.26
Depending upon the violation and the Commission’s judgment of
the best interests of the state, the Commission might refer the
violation to be reviewed by the Inter-American Court.27 According
to the Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, the
Inter-American Court is an “autonomous judicial institution whose
purpose is the application and interpretation of the American
Convention on Human Rights. The Court exercises its functions in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention and the Statute.”28
When considered necessary, the Court imposes upon the responsible
state (or states) the obligation to make reparations for the harm
caused and to pay an adequate indemnity.29 Furthermore, Article
63(1) of the Convention states that in the event of a violation, “the

24. Id. ¶ 81.
25. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 44. For more detail on the Commission’s
procedure for resolving cases, see the Commission’s website article, What is the IACHR?,
http://www.iachr.org/what.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
26. Rules for admissibility of petitions and procedures for resolution of the matter are
outlined in the Convention at Articles 46 through 51. Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 46–
51.
27. Id. at art. 61; see also What is the IACHR?, supra note 25 (“The decision as to
whether a case should be submitted to the Court or published should be made on the basis of
the best interests of human rights in the Commission’s judgment.”).
28. Organization of American States [OAS], Statute of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, art. 1, AG/RES. 448 (IX-O/79), (Oct. 1979), available at
http://www.cidh.org/basicos/english/basic19.statute %20of%20the%20ia%20court.htm.
29. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 63.
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Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of
his right of freedom that was violated.”30 Thus, the Court not only
has power to order states to pay indemnities, it also has power to
enjoin the States prospectively to guarantee their citizens’ human
rights.
Unlike those of the Commission, the decisions of the Court have
a definitive character and may not be appealed.31 Therefore, the
condemned State must respect and comply with them. However, in
order for the Court to issue binding decisions on particular cases, the
state in question must have already consented to the Court’s
“contentious jurisdiction.”32 For those states that do subject
themselves to the Court’s jurisdiction, the rights guaranteed by the
Convention trump any contrary state law, and the Court constitutes
the highest authority on the interpretation and protection of those
rights. In cases of extreme gravity, demonstrated need, or in order to
avoid irreparable harm, Article 26 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure
provides that the Court may ex-officio, or at the request of the
parties, judge that a member State adopt provisional measures.33
Certainly member states are not always anxious to comply with
Court decisions. The Court generally issues two types of remedies
for a member’s violation: (1) a trial and decision pursuant to
alterations in the state’s domestic law, and (2) monetary
compensation.34 However, while states do often pay financial
compensation, they “routinely ignore the requirement that they
punish offenders or change their laws.”35 While the Court does not

30. Id.
31. Id. at arts. 67–68 (“The judgment of the Court shall be final and not subject to
appeal.”).
32. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 62; see Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice
of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L. L. 1, 2 (1985); Andrew T.
Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1693,
1721 (2008) (noting that each member country of the Organization “must make a separate
declaration to the Secretary General of the OAS giving unconditional consent to jurisdiction,
or consent on condition of reciprocity, for a specific period of specific cases”). As of 2008,
twenty-four countries have submitted to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. Id. Significantly,
the United States and Canada are not among them. Id. The American states’ various
declarations, reservations, and denunciations of the Court and Convention are available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/b-32.html.
33. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS art.
26(1) (2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/motivos_ing.pdf.
34. Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 32, at 1721.
35. Eric A. Posner & John C. YOO, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals,
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release positive statistics for full compliance with its decisions, figures
can be derived from other statistics kept by the Court. In 2007 the
Court reported that it had decided ninety-five cases over the course
of its existence.36 It further reported that eighty-four cases remained
in a stage of monitoring of compliance.37 Since the Court only closes
a case after it has declared full compliance, one would assume that
only eleven cases had obtained a level of compliance sufficient to
warrant the cessation of monitoring. If this estimate is accurate, the
rate of full compliance with Court decisions would be about 11.6%.38
Increased member compliance with Commission opinions and Court
decisions is one of the main goals for the organization’s future.
D. The Relation between Regional Inter-American Norms Protecting
Religious Freedom and Member States’ Domestic Laws
On several occasions, the Court and the Inter-American
Commission have made pronouncements stipulating that states
parties to the Convention cannot invoke internal laws to circumvent
Inter-American System compliance. The most telling illustrations of
this principle are revealed in the Commission’s and the Court’s
amnesty cases. For instance, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Chile,
Suriname, and El Salvador39 passed amnesty laws that the
Commission considered to be incompatible with the content and
spirit of the Convention.40 Moreover, when Peru implemented a
decree providing amnesty to individuals suspected of substantial
human rights violations,41 the Court found that the Peruvian

93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 43 (2005).
36. Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 59 (2007).
37. Id. at 64.
38. Posner and Yoo, writing in 2005, estimate an even lower rate of compliance of 5%.
Posner & Yoo, supra note 35, at 43. They observe that, according to their estimate, the Court
enjoys a mere 1% advantage over compliance with the Commission’s non-binding
recommendations. Id.
39. See generally PHILIP ALSTON & JAMES CRAWFORD, THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 336 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
40. See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Reporting in the Inter-American System of
Human Rights Protection, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING
333, 336 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
41. These violations included torture; summary, extra-legal, and arbitrary executions;
and forced disappearances. See Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade, The Merits of
Coordination of International Courts on Human Rights, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 309, 311
(2004).
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government had passed these laws intending to impede the
investigation of human-rights violations and were therefore
prohibited by the Convention.42 Similar rulings have been applied to
amnesty laws adopted by Chile, Suriname, and El Salvador.
In the case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, the Court judged
that the Chilean amnesty law, Decree No. 2.191, was inconsistent
with the content and spirit of the Convention and therefore had no
legal effect.43 The origins of the case stemmed from a coup d’état
which overthrew the Chilean government on September 11, 1973.44
In connection with the coup, the new military government
performed a “cleanup operation” wherein it summarily executed
several officials of the former government as well as individuals
thought to be dangerous because of their leftist ideas.45 On
September 16, 1973, Mr. Almonacid-Arellano, an activist in the
Chilean Communist Party, was arrested at his home and then shot
by the police while entering the police truck.46 He was taken by the
police to the hospital where he died the following day.47 Chilean
courts initiated a criminal investigation, but after nearly a year of
dismissals and appeals, the Appeals Court of Rancagua confirmed the
investigation’s dismissal.48 In 1978, the government declared that
the Chilean state had overcome the “civil commotion” that had
required military rule and, citing a need for national unity, passed a
decree providing amnesty “to all individuals who performed illegal
acts, whether as perpetrators, accomplices or accessories after the
fact, during the siege in force from September 11, 1973 . . . .”49 The
military regime ended in 1990, and after domestic criminal charges
for Almonacid-Arellano’s murder failed, Mr. Almonacid-Arellano’s
next of kin filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission

42. See id. (discussing the Court’s judgment in the case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
docs/casos/articulos/seriec_75_ing.pdf).
43. Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 119
(Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec_154_ing.pdf.
44. Id. ¶ 82(3).
45. Id. ¶¶ 82(3)–(7).
46. Id. ¶¶ 82(8)–(9).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. ¶ 82(10).
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challenging the amnesty decree.50 Finally, in 2005 the Court received
the case and in 2006 found Chile’s amnesty law to violate
Convention norms.51
Similarly, in the case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, the Court found
Peru’s amnesty laws52 incompatible with the American Convention
on Human Rights and, therefore, “lack[ing] legal effect.”53 The
Commission adopted the same posture, and the Court confirmed it
in relation to the 1989 amnesty law of Suriname, formerly Dutch
Guiana, in the case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname.54
The Commission case of Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y
Galdámez v. El Salvador55 is considered of great political, social, and
religious significance on an international level. The Inter-American
Commission determined that the Republic of El Salvador’s approval

50. See id. ¶¶ 6, 82(11)–(37).
51. Id. ¶¶ 121–22 (“Since it ratified the American Convention on August 21, 1990, the
State has kept Decree Law No. 2.191 in force for sixteen years, overtly violating the
obligations set forth in said Convention. . . . [T]he Court determines that by formally keeping
within its legislative corpus a Decree Law which is contrary to the wording and the spirit of the
Convention, the State has not complied with the obligations imposed by Article 2 thereof.”).
52. The Peruvian decree, adopted by the Congress of Peru on June 14, 1995, and
signed by the President the next day granted a general amnesty to all those members of the
security forces and civilians who were the subject of a complaint, investigation, indictment, trial
or conviction, or who were serving prison sentences for human rights violations committed
between May 1980 and June 15, 1995. Barrios Altos v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.
75, ¶ 2(i)–(j) (Mar. 14, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/seriec_75_ing.pdf. The effect of the decree was to quash the judicial investigations
that had been initiated by Judge Antonia Saquicuray of the Sixteenth Criminal Court of Lima.
Id. ¶¶ 2(h)–(i). Judge Saquicuray, however, held the law contrary to the Constitution and
therefore inapplicable to the pending criminal case. Id. ¶ 2(k). This decision was appealed, but
before a public hearing could be held, the Peruvian Congress approved a second amnesty law,
Law No. 26492, which “declared that the amnesty could not be ‘revised’ by a judicial instance
and that its application was obligatory,” id. ¶ 2(l)–(m), thus preventing judgments from being
pronounced regarding the legality or applicability of the first amnesty law. Id.; see also Gómez
Palomino v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 136, ¶ 54.7 (Nov. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_136_ing.pdf.
53. Barrios Altos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 44.
54. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 167
(June 15, 2005), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec_124_ing.pdf (“As the Tribunal has asserted on repeated occasions, no domestic law or
regulation—including amnesty laws and statutes of limitation—may impede the State’s
compliance with the Court’s orders to investigate and punish perpetrators of human rights
violations. If this were not the case, the rights found in the American Convention would be
deprived of effective protection.” (footnote omitted)).
55. Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez v. El Salvador, Case 11.481, InterAm. C.H.R., Report No. 37/00, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. (1999), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/merits/elsalvador11.481.htm.

584

DO NOT DELETE

575

9/18/2009 4:45 PM

The Implementation of Inter-American Norms

of the “General Amnesty Law for the Consolidation of Peace”
(Decree No. 486 of 1993) was a violation of the Convention.56
More explicitly, the Commission declared that the State in question:
[V]iolated Article 2 of the American Convention. In addition, by
applying it to this case, the State has violated the right to justice
and its duty to investigate, try, and make reparations, established in
Articles 1(1), 8(1), and 25 of the American Convention, to the
detriment of Monsignor Romero’s next-of-kin, the members of the
religious community to which he belonged and Salvadoran society
as a whole.57

In similar fashion, the Commission declared that by approving this
law, the Salvadorian government violated the “right to know the
truth,”58 thereby injuring the relatives of Monsignor Romero, his
religious community, and all Salvadorian society.
Thus, a characteristic of the Inter-American System is the
preemption of conventional regional norms over state internal laws
that might offend protected human rights or restrict judicial
procedure. When a country’s domestic laws encroach on
fundamental human rights, it is the responsibility of the Commission
and the Court within the Inter-American System to preserve
enjoyment of these rights by declaring those laws invalid.
III. PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM
A. Protecting the Right to Conscientious Objection and Religious
Freedom Through an “Amicable Solution”— Case of Alfredo Díaz
Bustos v. Bolivia
While cases condemning states for denial of religious freedom do
not dominate the dockets of the Commission and the Court, the
American Convention on Human Rights guarantees religious
freedom so such cases would therefore fall within the jurisdiction of
both the Commission and the Court. In the case of Alfredo Díaz
Bustos v. Bolivia, the Ombudsman of the Republic of Bolivia, on
behalf of Mr. Bustos, a member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith,

56. Id. ¶¶ 1–4.
57. Id. ¶ 158, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/
ElSalvador11.481a.htm.
58. Id. ¶¶ 146–48.
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sought assistance from the Inter-American Commission.59 The
petition claimed that Bolivia had violated Articles 1(1) (duty of the
state to recognize rights and freedoms recognized in the
Convention), 2 (duty of the state to adopt internal legal provisions
to protect human rights), 12 (right to freedom of conscience and
religion), 24 (right to equal protection), and 25 (right to judicial
protection) of the Convention.60 The Commission further identified
potential violations of Articles 13.1 (freedom of thought and
expression), 22 (freedom of movement and residence), and 23 (right
to participate in government) and declared the case admissible.61
According to Mr. Bustos, Bolivia violated his freedom of
conscience and religion and failed to comply with its obligations to
protect rights guaranteed by the convention by refusing his claim to
exemption from military service.62 The state further violated his right
to equal protection by discriminating against him as a member of the
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses since Bolivian law permitted
the exemption of Catholics from military service but not members of
other faiths and religious confessions.63 Mr. Bustos further argued
that, since the Bolivian Constitutional Court had held that “the right
to conscientious objection to compulsory military service was not
within the purview of the courts,” Bolivia had also deprived him of
the right to judicial protection.64
The case of Alfredo Díaz Bustos v. Bolivia is a good example of
the application of Article 48(1)(f) of the Convention, which requires
the Commission to “place itself at the disposal of the parties . . . with
a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of
respect for the human rights recognized in [the] Convention.”65 On
July 4, 2005, Bolivia and Bustos reached a friendly settlement in
which Bolivia agreed to give Bustos his document of completed
military service and to stipulate that as a conscientious objector, the
government would not send him to the battlefront nor call him as an

59. Alfredo Díaz Bustos v. Bolivia, Admissibility Petition 14/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 52/04, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.122, doc. 5. rev. 1, ¶¶ 1–2 (2004), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2004eng/Bolivia.14.04eng.htm.
60. Id.
61. Id. ¶ 4.
62. Id. ¶ 2.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 48(1)(f).
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aide in an armed conflict.66 For his part, Bustos agreed to (1) present
a sworn statement (this was required for internal administrative
purposes of the Ministry of Defense); (2) request that the
Commission assign the status of friendly settlement to the case; and
(3) renounce all costs and damages and agree not to initiate a new
action based on the same facts.67
An aspect of great relevance in this case was its influence in
modifying the application of internal norms of the member states of
the Inter-American System. As part of the agreement between
parties, Bolivia, represented by the Ministry of Defense, agreed to:
[I]nclude the right to conscientious objection to military service in
the preliminary draft of the amended regulations for military law
currently under consideration by the Ministry of Defense and the
armed forces; [and] together with the Deputy Ministry of Justice,
to encourage congressional approval of military legislation that
would include the right to conscientious objection to military
service.68

The resolution of this case by friendly settlement precluded the
Commission from issuing any recommendations regarding whether
Article 12 of the Convention guarantees an absolute right to object
to compulsory military service.69 The case does, however, show the
profound effect that the Commission can have on developing the
internal laws of states in the Inter-American System. Bolivia began at
a point where the question of whether individuals had a right to
conscientious objection could not even be considered by the highest
court, but ended with an agreement to encourage congressional
approval of such a right. Unfortunately, the Commission appears not
to have pursued Bolivia’s adoption of these measures, and thus, the
right to conscientious objection on religious grounds in Bolivia
remains unclear.
66. Alfredo Díaz Bustos v. Bolivia, Friendly Settlement, Petition 14/04, Inter- Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 97/05, OES/Ser.L./V/II.124 Doc. 5, ¶ 16 (2005), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/ 2005eng/Bolivia14.04eng.htm.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See HITOMI TAKEMURA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE AND INDIVIDUAL DUTIES TO DISOBEY MANIFESTLY
ILLEGAL ORDERS 116–17 (2008). The Commission did express the opinion that the friendly
settlement was “fully consonant with the evolving nature of international human rights law,
which protects the status of conscientious objector in those countries in which that status has
been established by law.” Alfredo Diaz Bustos Friendly Settlement, ¶ 19 (emphasis added).
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B. Implementing Inter-American Norms Through Adjudication—the
Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” v. Chile
The Inter-American Court case of “The Last Temptation of
Christ”70 is perhaps the most renowned and contentious case relating
to the right to freedom of religion in all of the Inter-American
System of Human Rights Protection.71 In this case, Chilean citizens
accused the Chilean government of violating Articles 12 (freedom of
religion) and 13 (freedom of thought and expression) of the
Convention based on the “judicial censorship of the cinematographic
exhibition of the film ‘The Last Temptation of Christ,’ confirmed by
the Supreme Court of Chile . . . on June 17, 1997.”72
The dispute surrounded Martin Scorsese’s controversial film, The
Last Temptation of Christ, based on the book by Nikos Kazantzakis.
In the film, the story of Jesus is portrayed but departs significantly
from the rendition of the Gospels, including several elements
considered
outrageous
by
Christians.73
The
Chilean
Cinematographic Classification Council, a body authorized to
supervise exhibition of films in Chile, originally refused to allow the
exhibition of the film.74 However, in 1996, United International
Pictures Ltd. succeeded in obtaining the Council’s authorization to
exhibit the film for mature audiences.75 The Chilean Supreme
Court’s censorship soon followed after a group of Chileans, acting
“for and in the name of Jesus Christ, the Catholic Church, and
themselves” obtained a judgment from the Court of Appeal of
Santiago annulling the Council’s decision to authorize the film’s
exhibition on January 20, 1997.76 The Supreme Court confirmed the
Court of Appeal’s decision on June 17, 1997.77 According to the
70. “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et al. v. Chile), Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/seriec_73_ing.pdf.
71. See, e.g., Benedetto Conforti, La Tutela Internazionale della Libertà Religiosa, XV. 2
Rivista Internazionale dei Diritti dell’Uomo 269–83 (2002).
72. “The Last Temptation of Christ” Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶¶ 1–2.
73. For instance, the film portrays Christ as an ordinary man struggling with guilt and
sexual temptations and also shows him forsaking his mission for a life of mortal comfort. See
The Last Temptation of Christ (film), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Last_
Temptation_of_Christ_(film) (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
74. “The Last Temptation of Christ” Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 60.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Chilean Supreme Court, the defamed and dishonored presentation
of the figure of Jesus Christ offended all those who, as was the case
of the petitioners, founded their faith in Him.78
The Court received the case after the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, during its 100th regular session,
adopted report No. 69/98.79 In that report, the Commission
concluded that: (1) the prohibition of the film The Last Temptation
of Christ by the Chilean courts was incompatible with the norms of
the Convention; (2) the Chilean State had violated the rights
protected by Articles 12 (freedom of conscience and religion) and 13
(freedom of thought and expression) of the Convention; and (3) by
upholding this censorship, the Chilean state had not complied with
its commitment made in Article 2 of the Convention, which required
it to adopt internal regulations that protected the rights recognized
by the Convention.80 The report recognized the efforts of the
Chilean democratic government to effectuate the right to freedom of
expression, but recommended that the Chilean government suspend
the censorship of the film The Last Temptation of Christ and also
recommended that the Chilean government adopt internal
legislation to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
protected by the Convention.81 These recommendations were not
accepted by the Chilean government and, consequently, the
Commission directed the case to the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights.82 The Commission requested the Court to order
Chile:
1. To authorize the normal cinematographic exhibition and
publicity of the film “The Last Temptation of Christ.”
2. To adapt its constitutional and legal norms to the standards of
freedom of expression embodied in the American Convention, [in
order] to eliminate prior censorship of cinematographic
productions and their publicity.

78. See id. ¶ 45(c) (summarizing the expert report of José Zalaquett Daher, lawyer,
specializing in human rights, who had argued before the Commission that the Supreme
Court’s decision to “suppress declarations made in the film as blasphemous or at least heretical
because, in that Court’s opinion, they were shocking” constituted a confusion of the issues).
79. Id. ¶ 10.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
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3. To ensure that, in the exercise of their different powers, public
bodies[,] their authorities and officials [effectively] exercise the
rights and freedoms of expression, conscience and religion
recognized in the American Convention and . . . abstain from
imposing prior censorship on cinematographic productions.
4. To make reparations to the victims in this case for the damage
suffered.
5. To pay the costs and reimburse the expenses incurred by the
victims when litigating this case in both [the] domestic sphere and
before the Commission and the Court, as well as reasonable fees for
their representatives.83

The case was resolved with a unanimous decision of merit and
reparations by the Court on February 5, 2001. The Court affirmed
the existence of a violation by Chile of the right to freedom of
expression and thought protected by Article 13 of the Convention.84
However, the Court determined that Chile had not violated the
right to freedom of religion protected under Article 12.85 The Court
explained its rejection of the Article 12 claim in paragraph seventynine.86 The Court declared that the right to freedom of conscience
and religion “is one of the foundations of democratic society. In its
religious dimension, it constitutes a far-reaching element in the
protection of the convictions of those who profess a religion and in
their way of life.”87 With this understanding, after analyzing the
probable violation of the right to religious freedom, the Court
decided that Chile had not violated the religious freedom in
accordance with the norms of Article 12 of the Convention since the
prohibition “did not impair or deprive anyone of their right to
maintain, change, profess or disseminate their religion or beliefs with
total freedom.”88
In his separate opinion, Judge Roux-Rengifo further interpreted
the protection of religious freedom. He interpreted Article 12 to
prohibit coercion in religious matters, including coercion to retain

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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Id.
Id. ¶ 79.
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religious beliefs.89 According to Judge Roux-Rengifo, in order for
the censorship to have violated Article 12, the petitioners would have
had to prove by specific evidence that the prohibition impaired their
personal rights to change their religious beliefs.90 The judge agreed
that a state has the duty to guarantee the freedom of every individual
to change religion or beliefs, which is “usually the result of a long,
complex process that includes hesitation, reflection and research.”91
He emphasized that the state should guarantee that:
[A] person may undergo this process in an environment of
complete freedom and, in particular, that no one should be
prevented from gathering information and experience and all
the elements of an emotional, conceptual or any other
nature, without violating the rights of others, that he
considers necessary in order to make a fully-informed
decision to change or maintain his faith.92
Judge Roux-Rengifo concluded by declaring that “if the State, by act
or omission, fails to ensure those rights, it violates the right to
freedom of conscience and religion.”93 The prohibition of the film,
however, simply did not rise to the level of preventing anyone from
realizing these rights.
For Chile, the consequences of this ruling included a
requirement to modify its domestic law in order to eliminate the
censorship of the film, and also an order to reimburse the victims
and their representatives for expenses arising from the proceedings.94
In its November 28, 2003, order, the Court declared that Chile had
fully complied with its declaration.95
The Court’s decision in this case, finding that censorship violated
freedom of expression but not religious freedom, as Conforti
agrees,96 was most likely influenced by the posture adopted with

89. Id. (Roux-Rengifo, J., separate opinion).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. ¶¶ 103(4)–(5) (full court opinion).
95. “The Last Temptation of Christ” Case (Olmedo Bustos et al. v. Chile), Compliance
with Judgment at 6, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Nov. 28, 2003), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
docs/supervisiones/tentacion_28_11_03_ing.pdf.
96. Conforti, supra note 71, at 283 (“La Corte interamericana ha adottato l’approccio
della Commissione europea, ritenendo che proprio l’interdizione totale, e non limitata ai soli
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respect to religious freedom in the European System. In fact, in its
judgment, the Court cited the European Court of Human Rights in
finding that the right to freedom of expression includes the right to
convey information that may “shock, concern or offend the State or
any sector of the population.”97
On one hand, this decision recognized that a state can limit the
exercise of free religious expression when there is a conflict with
other rights or when such expression constitutes a threat to society
or political stability.98 On the other hand, however, the Court
concluded that, in the terms of the Convention, the state cannot
prohibit the exercise of religious expression by prior censorship when
it does not incite violence.99 Thus, it can be seen that the InterAmerican Court interprets the freedom of expression as one of the
foundational principles of democratic society, considering it an abuse
to censor ideas and opinions, even if they are unpopular.100
Moreover, according to the understanding of the Inter-American
Court, the right to freedom of expression in a religious sense is valid
not only for those ideas that are favorably received, but also for those
that shock, unsettle, or offend a state or a fraction of its
population.101
adulti, della proiezione della pellicola, abbia violato la libertà di espressione.”).
97. “The Last Temptation of Christ” Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 69
(quoting Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 49, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=
handyside&sessionid=21918775&skin=hudoc-en).
98. See id. ¶¶ 76–80 (finding that the state did not violate Article 12 because the
censorship “did not impair or deprive anyone of their right to maintain, change, profess or
disseminate their religion or beliefs with total freedom” and recognizing that freedom of
religious expression “may be subject only to the limitations prescribed by law that are necessary
to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others”).
99. See id. ¶ 63 (citing Article 13, which prohibits prior censorship of expression except
when necessary “for the sole purpose of regulating access to [public entertainments] for the
moral protection of childhood and adolescence” and criminalizes “[a]ny propaganda for war
and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless
violence”).
100. Id. ¶¶ 64–69 (identifying both an individual dimension (right to express one’s
thoughts) and a social dimension (right to receive information and thoughts expressed by
others) in the right to freedom of thought and expression and concluding that “both
dimensions are of equal importance and should be guaranteed simultaneously in order to give
total effect to the right of freedom of thought and expression in the terms of Article 13 of the
Convention”).
101. Id. ¶ 69 (quoting Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 49,
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=handyside&sessionid=21918775&skin=hudoc-en).
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IV. CONCLUSION

The American Convention on Human Rights has changed the
way the OAS encourages member states to adopt human rights
norms in their internal legal structures. With the reorganization of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the creation
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Convention
established legal organs to more effectively effectuate human rights.
As states ratified the Convention, they agreed to implement the
rights outlined therein and to subject themselves to the reports and
recommendations of the Commission and the contentious
jurisdiction of the Court.
While these measures have made the advancement of human
rights protection in the Inter-American System possible, the
effectiveness and relevancy of the Commission and the Court still
face significant challenges. Foremost among these challenges is the
lack of power to enforce the recommendations and decisions made
against specific states. As mentioned above, states frequently ignore
orders from the Court to investigate and punish those responsible
for human rights violations.102 Going further, another weakness of
the Inter-American System is the distinct grade of participation of
the member of OAS in their human rights protection’s organs. Two
of the most important nations of the hemisphere in territory and
economic influence are not part of the Inter-American
Convention,103 and in consequence refuse to recognize the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. In this sense, it is
important to consider the limited adhesion of English speaking
countries and the contrary massive adhesion of Latin American
countries to the system’s organs and legal instruments.
This result stands in stark contrast to the circumstances observed
in the European human rights system. While the European Court of
Human Rights does not see full compliance with every decision
handed down, the rate of compliance in that system far exceeds the

102. See discussion supra Part II.C; see also Morse H. Tan, Upholding Human Rights in
the Hemisphere: Casting Down Impunity Through the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 243, 272 (2008).
103. Canada has not signed the Convention and, while the U.S. signed the Convention
in 1977, it has never ratified it. See Organization of American States, American Convention on
Human Rights Signatories and Ratifications, http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/b32.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
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rate observed thus far by the Inter-American Court.104 Why should
this be? Both systems have in place methods for monitoring
compliance and these methods appear to be substantially similar. In
Europe, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, with the
assistance of the Department for the Execution of Judgments,
supervises compliance with decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights by requiring state reporting of steps taken in
compliance with judgments.105 Similarly, the Inter-American Court
monitors compliance by receiving reports from the states along with
observations from complainants and the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights.106 Why then should the European system enjoy a
high rate of compliance while the Inter-American System fails to
achieve complete remediation of human rights violations?
The answer to this question is now and probably will remain
elusive. Posner and Yoo argue that the success of independent
adjudicative bodies in the European system is best explained by the
unique political arrangement of the European states.107 While many
member states of the OAS do share certain political attributes and
colonial origins, their political and economic ties are far less
substantial than those found in the European system. Perhaps it is
this political difference that explains the Inter-American System’s
104. Posner and Yoo complain that good data to corroborate compliance estimates for
the European Court of Human Rights is not available. Posner & Yoo, supra note 35, at 65.
However, based on their count, states subject to an ECHR judgment alter their domestic law
in compliance with the judgment about sixty-four percent of the time. Id.; see also Laurence R.
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107
YALE L.J. 273, 296 (1997) (“The rate of compliance by states with the ECHR’s rulings is
extremely high. Indeed, its judgments have been described as being ‘as effective as those of any
domestic court.’” (citing BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
309 (2d ed. 1995))).
105. After the judgment is handed down, the Committee of Ministers invites the state
subject to the judgment to report on the measures it has taken to comply. The Committee
does not strike the judgment off its list of cases until the state has fully complied. In the event a
state resists compliance, the Committee may apply political or diplomatic pressure. Council of
Europe, Monitoring arrangements and means used by the Committee of Ministers,
http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/execution/01_introduction/01_introduction.asp#P
88_12564.
106. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS art.
63 (2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/motivos_ing.pdf.
107. Posner & Yoo, supra note 35, at 66 (“We believe that the relationship between
states within the European Union is closer to the relationship between, say, Illinois and
Indiana, than the relationship between Indonesia and Peru. European states share a legislative
body, a bureaucracy, and a decades-long commitment to political unity. Other states do
not.”).
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comparatively low rate of compliance. Or, conversely, perhaps low
compliance should be expected and the European System’s success is
abnormal.108
Perhaps another factor that could contribute to this difference in
compliance is the type of cases heard in each system. Since its
foundation, the Inter-American Court has frequently had to respond
to the violent violations of human rights perpetrated by many LatinAmerican dictatorial governments, including disappearances,
arbitrary and summary executions, and the like.109 The European
Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, hears comparatively few
cases regarding such atrocities and, instead, often hears cases
regarding “ordinary” violations of human rights, such as the right to
a fair trial or free speech.110 With violent violations of human rights,
full remedy of the violation requires investigation, prosecution, and
punishment of those responsible. Conversely, with “ordinary”
violations of human rights, mere payment of damages and revision of
violating domestic laws will often suffice. Yet, as discussed above,
compliance with orders to pay damages is high, even in the InterAmerican System.111 American states, however, often ignore orders
to punish those responsible for violating human rights or, when they
do respond, they often inflict only light sentences.112 Thus, while full
compliance in general among the American states appears low, these
numbers might be deceptive when it comes to the Court’s and the
Commission’s protection of religious rights because compliance with
those judgments may not inflict the same costs upon states as orders
to criminally punish wrongdoers.

108. It has been said that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international
law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” David H. Moore, Essay, A
Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 879, 879 (2003) (quoting
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979)). However, noncompliance with
international law is prevalent and has been observed to be, perhaps, most prevalent in the
context of international human rights law. Id.
109. See David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American
Achievement, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1–2 (David J. Harris &
Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998).
110. Id.
111. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
112. See Tan, supra note 102, at 271–72 (hypothesizing that states may be unwilling to
prosecute human rights violations either because they lack the resources to bring perpetrators
to justice or because investigation might reveal that the government itself was responsible and
accepting responsibility would be politically untenable).

595

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/18/2009 4:45 PM

2009

While only a small number of the Commission’s
recommendations and the Court’s decisions have dealt directly with
the issue of religious freedom, they have had a profound effect in
applying the Inter-American Human Right’s instruments and norms
to the laws of the states that have complied with the
recommendations and decisions. Furthermore, decisions not dealing
directly with religious freedom have nevertheless had an impact on
the religious freedom for citizens of the member states. Applying
laws respecting the rights of conscientious objectors to all individuals
no matter what their creed has been a change that recognizes an
individual’s right to practice a religion that may not be shared by the
majority of citizens in a particular state. Encouraging states to repeal
amnesty laws will help to bring to justice those who have violated
basic human rights, including religious freedom.
While the Court’s decision in the “Last Temptation of Christ”
case stated that Chile had not violated the religious freedom
provision of the Convention (Article 12) when it refused to allow the
showing of the film, The Last Temptation of Christ, the decision did
focus on freedom of expression, which has a profound effect upon
the enablement of religious freedom. Just as the Court allowed
expression that was contrary to certain religious beliefs, some may
see the decision as promoting the freedom to express religious beliefs
and to practice religion without the fear of censure by the state.
The legal instruments and the action of the Court and of the
Commission mediating and adjudicating human rights violations has
created a stronger voice for the effectuation of human rights norms
through national laws and constitutions. While full compliance with
recommendations and decisions is not high, both organs have had a
relevant impact in changing the laws of member states. Perhaps more
importantly, however, the recommendations and decisions have
brought more attention to human rights violations and have put a
spotlight on the norms of the American Convention of Human
Rights as a model for the proper treatment of individuals. Religious
freedom plays an important part in these norms, and the efforts of
the Commission and the Court have and will continue to stand as a
symbol of the Inter-American System’s dedication to improving this
right for all peoples.
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